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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DEAN ALAN SHEPHARD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030235-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his conviction for possessing or operating a clandestine laboratory, 
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(l)(a), (b) (2002), in the 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the honorable Sheila K. McCleve presiding.1 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the pour-over provision of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)0(2003). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did defendant constructively possess a methamphetamine laboratory, where 
defendant's jacket and backpack, which contained glassware and a methamphetamine 
precursor, were found next to the laboratory in the garage, and defendant's 
fingerprints were found on glassware and a digital scale in the house he occupied? 
1
 A violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(l) is only a second degree felony; 
however, defendant's conviction was enhanced to a first degree felony pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37d-5(l)(d) because the jury found that the clandestine laboratory was 
located with 500 feet of a residence (R. 5, 251, 318:298-99). 
"A jury conviction will be reversed for insufficient evidence 'only if the evidence 
presented at trial is so insufficient that reasonable minds could not have reached the 
verdict'" Statev. Widdison, 2001 UT60,Tf74,28P.3d 1278 (quoting State v. Colwell,2000 
UT8,^40,994P.2dl77). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
This case requires the application of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4 (2002), attached as 
Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with one count of possessing or operating a clandestine 
laboratory, one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, one 
count of possession of drug paraphernalia, and one count of giving false personal 
information to a police officer (R. 5-8). Defendant pled not guilty to all counts, and a jury 
trial was held (R. 317-18). The jury convicted defendant of the first three counts and 
acquitted him of the charge of giving false personal information to a police officer (R. 251-
54; 318:298-99). Defendant never moved for a directed verdict, nor did he otherwise ask the 
trial court to dismiss the case for insufficient evidence. The court sentenced defendant to 
consecutive prison terms for each of the three convictions (R. 276-80; 319:8). Defendant 
filed a timely notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme Court (R. 281). That court poured the 
case over to this Court (R. 287-88). Defendant appeals only his conviction for possessing or 
operating a clandestine laboratory. Br. Aplt. at 1, 20-21. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
The evening of December 3, 2001, Salt Lake City Police officers responded to a 
citizen report of a burglary at a house just south of Trolley Square (R. 317:62-63, 68-69, 
113). When they arrived, they found Todd Turner exiting the detached garage next to the 
house (R. 317:64; 318:247). Officers performed a protective sweep of the garage and 
discovered what appeared to be a clandestine laboratory (R. 317:92,144-55,171). Officers 
then knocked on the side door of the house, and defendant answered (R. 317:66). Defendant 
told the officers that he did not own the home and had been sleeping on the couch (R. 
317:66-67). The officers removed defendant from the home and performed a protective 
sweep in which they found 3.4 grams of methamphetamine on a digital scale, a recipe for 
cooking methamphetamine, glassware, chemicals used in the manufacture of 
methamphetamine, and, next to the scale, several small Ziploc bags of the size commonly 
used to package and distribute methamphetamine (317:66-67, 81, 83, 86-90; State's Ex. 
Nos. 2-3; Defendant's Ex. No. 1). 
Narcotics officers were called to the scene to dismantle and dispose of the clandestine 
laboratory (R. 317:78-79,139, 142). Agent Boelter discovered an electrical extension cord 
running from the house to the garage (R. 317:142; State's Ex. No. 11). In the garage he 
found a fully functional methamphetamine laboratory in the process of manufacturing a 
batch of methamphetamine (R. 317:144,149-155; State's Ex. Nos. 15-26). Agent Boelter 
Except as otherwise noted, this brief recites the facts in the light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, If 2, 12 P-3d 92. 
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later testified that a clandestine laboratory can be set up in about fifteen minutes (R. 
317:166). He also discovered a jacket and a backpack containing glassware, crystal iodine, 
hydrochloric acid, liquid methamphetamine, a digital scale, and drug paraphernalia (R. 
318:184-89; State's Ex. Nos. 27-29,30-34). A bicycle was parked next to the door leading 
into the garage (State's Ex. No. 12). 
Crime lab technicians photographed and processed the scene for fingerprints (R. 
317:117, 124; State's Ex. Nos. 8-10). Ten comparable fingerprints were taken from the 
digital scale found in the house and from a 1,000-milliliter glass beaker found in the house 
(R. 317:117,124-25). Two prints on the scale and one print on the glass beaker belonged to 
defendant (R. 317:131-32; State's Ex. Nos. 8-10). Two of the ten comparable prints 
belonged to the owner of the house, Micalyn Yocham (R. 317:13 5,141; 318:194). The other 
five prints were never identified (R. 317:135). 
Micalyn Yocham testified for the State at trial (R. 318:194-205). She stated that she 
had known defendant for several years and that he had been living in her house on and off 
for about a year before the clandestine laboratory was discovered (R. 318:194-95). When 
she left for work on the morning of December 3, 2001, defendant was not in the house and 
had not spent the night (R. 318:196-97). She also stated that there was no methamphetamine 
in the house (R. 318:197). Micalyn did not return to her house that day and only learned that 
the police had searched it when she retrieved a voice message from her work at midnight the 
morning of December 4, 2001 (R. 318:197). 
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Micalyn testified that when she left work on the morning in question, her house was 
not as messy as it appears in State's exhibit number one, and the kitchen table did not have a 
chair on top of it (R. 318:203; State's Ex. No. 1). She asserted that she had never before 
seen the 1,000-milliliter glass beaker bearing defendant's fingerprint that was found in her 
kitchen (R. 317:124; 318:199; State's Ex. Nos. 6, 10). She recognized the scale on which 
two of defendant's fingerprints were found, but thought it was in the closet when she left for 
work in the morning (R. 318:198). She stated that the bicycle found next to the garage door 
belonged to defendant and that the jacket in the garage looked like one that defendant owned 
(R. 318:201-02; State's Ex. No. 12). She also said that the backpack found in the garage 
looked like a backpack defendant owned (R. 318:202; State's Ex. No. 12). Micalyn claimed 
that she knew nothing about the laboratory in her garage and that when she left for work 
there was no power cord running between her house and her garage (R. 318:203-04; State's 
Ex. No. 11). She added that the beach towel covering the garage window was hers, but that 
she did not put it in the window (R. 318:204; State's Ex. No. 11). 
Todd Turner also testified for the State (R. 318:246-53). He stated that he had known 
defendant for about ten years and that defendant had told him on December 2, 2001 that he 
was staying at Micalyn's house (R. 318:246-47). Turner claimed that he had just arrived at 
Micalyn's house when police pulled up and arrested him (R. 318:247). He asserted that he 
went to the house looking for defendant because the muffler had just fallen off his truck and 
he needed to borrow some tools (R. 318:248). He also wanted to "get high" with defendant 
(R. 318:249-50). He brought some methamphetamine with him for that purpose, but also 
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stated that he had $20 and would have purchased any methamphetamine that defendant had 
with him (R. 318:250). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court may overturn a jury verdict only when it finds that the evidence presented 
at trial is so insufficient that reasonable minds could not have reached the verdict. It must 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Where the verdict rests on 
a finding of constructive possession, the evidence must establish a sufficient nexus between 
the accused and the contraband to permit an inference that the accused had the ability and the 
intent to exercise dominion and control over the contraband. 
In the instant case, the evidence was sufficient to permit an inference that defendant 
had the ability and intent to exercise dominion over an operating clandestine laboratory. 
Police discovered defendant sleeping in a house with an operating clandestine laboratory in 
the detached garage. Defendant's backpack and jacket were found in the garage. The 
backpack contained glassware, crystal iodine, hydrochloric acid, liquid methamphetamine, a 
digital scale, and drug paraphernalia. Defendant's fingerprints were found on a digital scale 
and a 1,000-milliliter glassware beaker in the house. The digital scale bore 3.4 grams of 
methamphetamine. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to conviction him of possession 
or operation of a clandestine laboratory. Aplt. Br. at 30. Specifically, defendant claims that 
the evidence established only that he was a non-exclusive occupant of the house and that he 
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did not therefore constructively possesses the laboratory. Aplt. Br. at 32-33. Defendant 
acknowledges that he did not preserve his claim in the trial court and asserts on appeal plain 
error and ineffective assistance of counsel. 
A trial court does not plainly err in sending a case to the jury if the evidence is 
sufficient to sustain a conviction. Likewise, trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to 
move for a directed verdict if the evidence is sufficient to withstand a directed verdict 
motion. See State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50, % 19,42 P.3d 1248 (holding that counsel is not 
ineffective for failing to make futile objections). Thus, defendant's claims fail because, as 
shown below, there was sufficient evidence to find that defendant constructively possessed 
the clandestine laboratory. 
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE JURY'S 
VERDICT, THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT DEFENDANT 
CONSTRUCTIVELY POSSESSED THE CLANDESTINE 
LABORATORY; THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
PLAINLY ERR AND TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE 
A. The standard of review for claims of insufficient evidence is highly 
deferential. 
On appellate review, a jury verdict is accorded the highest deference. The Utah 
Supreme Court has stated that it "will not lightly overturn a jury verdict." State v. Widdison, 
2001 UT 60, \ 14, 28 P.3d 1278; State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, \ 42, 994 P.2d 177; State v. 
McClain, 706 P.2d 603, 605 (Utah 1985). Hence, "[a] verdict rendered by a jury is 
overturned only if the evidence presented at trial is so insufficient that reasonable minds 
could not have reached the verdict." Colwell, 2000 UT 8, f 42. "When findings of all 
required elements of the crime can be reasonably made from the evidence, including the 
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reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it," the inquiry stops and the court must sustain 
the verdict. Id. In other words, this Court reviews the evidence presented at trial in a light 
most favorable to the verdict. Id. 
The reviewing court may not weigh the evidence or assess credibility. "When the 
evidence presented is conflicting or disputed, the jury serves as the exclusive judge of both 
the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given particular evidence." State v. 
Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). The reviewing court may, however, disregard 
evidence that is "so inconclusive or inherently improbable that it could not support a finding 
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt." Id. But only if there exists "a physical impossibility of 
the evidence being true" or if the evidence is clearly false "without any resort to inferences 
or deductions." Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 
B. Defendant failed to properly marshal the evidence. 
When a defendant attacks a conviction on the sufficiency of the evidence, he must 
first marshal all the evidence supporting the conviction and then demonstrate to the Court 
how the evidence is insufficient. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Proper marshalling requires 
the appellant to present, "in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists. After 
constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a 
fatal flaw in the evidence." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 
(Utah. App. 1991). Merely reviewing all the evidence before the fact finder is insufficient. 
See Heinecke v. Dep't of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 464 (Utah App. 1991) (finding that 
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defendant failed to satisfy marshaling obligation where he "reviewed in minute detail all the 
evidence" and "left it to the court to sort out what evidence actually supported the findings"). 
Rather, "[c]ounsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully assume 
the adversary's position." Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d at 1315. Failure to meet the 
marshaling burden is grounds to reject an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence. See, e.g., 
State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, Tf 16, 989 P.2d 1065; Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exck, 817 P.2d 
789, 800 (Utah 1991). 
Defendant never presents a single, unified compilation of only the facts supporting 
his guilt. Both his Statement of Relevant Facts and his Argument weave together 
inculpatory and exculpatory facts. Because defendant has "left it to the [Cjourt to sort 
out what evidence actually supported the findings," this Court should reject his claim. 
Heinecke, 810 P.2d at 464. 
C. The evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that defendant 
constructively possessed the clandestine laboratory. 
The Clandestine Laboratory Act makes it unlawful for a person to "knowingly or 
intentionally: (a) possess a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory operation; [or] (b) possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the 
intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(l)(a), 
(b). Defendant does not dispute that police discovered an operating clandestine laboratory in 
Micalyn's garage on December 3,2001. Aplt. Br. at 31-32. His only contention is that the 
State failed to "prove a sufficient nexus between [defendant] and that clandestine 
laboratory." Aplt. Br. at 21. 
9 
A person who does not have actual physical possession of controlled substance 
precursors or clandestine laboratory equipment may nevertheless be convicted of possession 
of a clandestine laboratory if the State can prove constructive possession. See State v. 
Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 132 (Utah 1987). To prove constructive possession, the evidence 
must demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the accused and the equipment or precursors to 
permit an inference that the accused had "the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and 
control over" the equipment or precursors. Utah Code Ann. §58-37-2( 1 )(dd) (2002); see 
also State v. Layman, 1999 U T 7 9 4 14,985 P.2d911;»ate v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316,319 (Utah 
1985). Whether such a nexus exists depends on "the unique facts and circumstances of each 
case which establish the requisite connection between an accused and the [contraband]." 
State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 132 (Utah 1987). Mere knowledge of the whereabouts of 
equipment or precursors or occupancy in their same location, however, without other proof 
of intent to use or control them, does not prove constructive possession. See Fox, 709 P.2d 
at 319. Rather, "the evidence 'must raise a reasonable inference that. . . defendant was 
engaged in a criminal enterprise and not simply a bystander.'" Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 
1999 UT App 61, U 7, 975 P.2d 501 (quoting Fox, 709 P.2d 319-20) (alteration in original). 
In the instant case, there is more than sufficient evidence to connect defendant to the 
clandestine laboratory in the garage. Defendant had been living in the house on and off for 
about a year prior to December 3, 2001 (R. 318:194-95). Micalyn testified that when she 
left for work in the morning, defendant had not spent the night, he was not present in the 
house, and, to her knowledge, there was not a clandestine laboratory in the garage or any 
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methamphetamine in the house (R. 318:196-97, 203). Micalyn also stated that the digital 
scale police found in the house was stored in the closet, that no extension cord was running 
from the home to the garage, and that her beach towel was not in the garage window (R. 
318:198,204). 
When police showed up at 6:30 p.m., they discovered a methamphetamine laboratory 
in the garage and defendant asleep on the couch (R. 317:66-67, 79, 92). They found 
defendant's coat and backpack in the garage and defendant's bike parked just outside the 
garage door (R. 318:184, 202). Defendant's backpack contained crystal iodine (a 
methamphetamine precursor), hydrochloric acid, glassware, liquid methamphetamine, a 
digital scale, and drug paraphernalia (R. 318:184-90, 202; State's Ex. No. 12, 27-29, 30-
34). Inside the house, police discovered the digital scale not in the closet, but on the kitchen 
table (R. 317:82-83; State's Ex. Nos. 2-3). The scale bore 3.4 grams of methamphetamine 
and two of defendant's fingerprints (R. 317:86, 131-32, State's Ex. Nos. 8-9). Several 
Ziploc bags of the size used to package and distribute methamphetamine were next to the 
scale (R. 317:83; State's Ex. Nos. 2-3). Police also found in the kitchen a 1,000-milliliter 
glass beaker, which Micalyn had never seen before, and which bore defendant's fingerprint 
(R. 317:131-32; 318:199; State'sEx.No. 10). A recipe for cooking methamphetamine was 
also found in the house (R. 317:83,103; Defendant's Ex. No. 1). Both Micalyn and Turner 
denied any knowledge of or involvement with the methamphetamine laboratory in the garage 
(R. 318:203, 252, 258). 
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If the jury believed Micalyn's testimony, the only reasonable inference it could draw 
was that defendant rode his bike over to Micalyn's house after she left for work, set up a 
clandestine laboratory in the garage, and began producing methamphetamine. Turner's 
testimony supports this inference. Turner stated that he drove to Micalyn's house with $20 
in his pocket hoping to be able to buy methamphetamine from defendant and get high with 
him (R. 318:250). 
The instant case is distinguishable from those cases cited by defendant in which Utah 
courts have refused to find constructive possession. Aplt. Br. at 23-30. In each of those 
cases, the only evidence to support a finding of constructive possession was the defendants' 
non-exclusive occupancy of the premises on which the contraband was found. See Fox, 709 
P.2d at 319-20 (holding that Clive Fox's non-exclusive occupancy of home where marijuana 
plants were found growing, without more, did not establish constructive possession); State v. 
Reed, 2000 UT App 258 at 1 (memorandum decision) (holding that non-exclusive occupancy 
of house did not establish constructive possession where laboratory equipment and 
controlled substance precursors were found in room rented by another occupant); Bryan, 
1999 UT App 61, ^ 9-11 (holding that defendant did not constructively possess drug 
paraphernalia found in her home where she was not present during the search and made no 
incriminating statements and the State presented no evidence that she used or intended to use 
the paraphernalia for illegal purposes); State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386,1389 (Utah App. 1991) 
(holding that defendant's non-exclusive ownership and occupancy of vehicle did not prove 
constructive possession of cocaine where cocaine was found in area of back seat not easily 
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accessible to defendant and where back seat passenger was seen moving furtively just before 
the traffic stop). 
The instant case is analogous to the situation of Gary Fox in State v. Fox. In Fox, 
Gary and Clive Fox were convicted of production a controlled substance, marijuana, and 
possession of that substance with intent to distribute. 709 P.2d at 318. Gary owned the 
house in which the marijuana plants were found, but the phone line was in Clive's name. Id 
at 318. One of the greenhouses containing marijuana plants was accessible only from the 
inside of the house. Id. Both Gary and Clive were seen occupying the house and working in 
the yard. Id. Police found marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and a copy of Marijuana 
Grower's Guide in Gary's bedroom. Id. No such evidence was found in Clive's bedroom. 
Id. Both men appealed their convictions on the ground of insufficient evidence. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed Gary's conviction. Id. at 320. It held that Gary's 
occupancy and ownership of the house, combined with the marijuana and drug paraphernalia 
found in his room, gave rise to a reasonable inference that Gary intended to use or control the 
marijuana plants found on his property. However, the court reversed Clive's conviction. Id. 
It found that the evidence proved only that Clive occupied the home and was aware of the 
marijuana. Id. No evidence supported an inference that Clive intended to use or control the 
marijuana. Id. 
Defendant is more like Gary than Clive. Not only did defendant occupy the home, his 
backpack and jacket were found in the garage where the clandestine laboratory was operating 
(R. 318:201-02; State's Ex. No 12). His backpack contained crystallized iodine, glassware, 
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hydrochloric acid, liquid methamphetamine, and other paraphernalia used in the production, 
distribution, and use of methamphetamine (R. 318:184-89, 202; State's Ex. No. 12,27-29, 
30-34). Additionally, his fingerprints were found on a digital scale bearing 3.4 grams of 
methamphetamine and on a 1,000-milliliter glass laboratory flask (R. 317:86, 131-32; 
State's Ex. Nos. 8-10). Defendant's fingerprints and personal effects thus establish a strong 
nexus between defendant and the production of methamphetamine on the property. 
Defendant cites to several facts that suggest that he did not have or intend to have 
dominion or control over the methamphetamine laboratory, including that both Turner and 
Micalyn had access to the garage and admitted to using methamphetamine, that defendant 
denied any knowledge of the methamphetamine laboratory, that defendant's fingerprints 
were not found on any equipment in the garage, that Micalyn only claimed that the backpack 
and jacket looked like items that defendant owned, and that Micalyn received a light 
sentence in exchange for testifying against defendant. Aplt. Br. at 31-34. "Defendant may 
not reargue the weight of [the] evidence, relying on testimony favoring innocence and 
ignoring the conflicting testimony against him." State v. Bingham, 732 P.2d 132,133 (Utah 
1987) (per curiam). "The fact that defendant's evidence contradicts the jury's determination 
does not require reversal on appeal." Id. 
Thus, defendant's claim fails. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
Respectfully submitted March 8, 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MATTHEW D. BATES 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on March 8, 2004,1 served two copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellee upon the defendant/appellant, Dean Alan Shephard, by causing them to be 
delivered by first class mail to Margaret P. Lindsay and Patrick V. Lindsay, his counsel of 
record, at Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin, 43 East 200 North, PO BOX "L," Provo, Utah 
84603-0200. 
Matthew D. Bates 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addendum 
58-37d-4. Prohibited acts — Second degree felony. 
(1) .It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally: 
(a) possess a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage 
in a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(b) possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage 
iii a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(c) sell, distribute, or otherwise supply a precursor chemical, laboratory 
equipment, or laboratory supplies knowing or having reasonable cause to 
believe it will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation; . 
(d) evade recordkeeping provisions of Title 58, Chapter 37c, Controlled 
Substances Precursor Act, or the regulations issued under that act, 
knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the material distrib-
uted or received will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(e) conspire with or aid another to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation; 
(f) produce or manufacture, or possess with intent to produce or 
manufacture a controlled or counterfeit substance except as authorized 
under Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act; or 
(g) transport or convey a controlled or counterfeit substance with the 
intent to distribute or to be distributed by the person transporting or 
conveying the controlled or counterfeit substance or by any other person 
regardless of whether the final destination for the distribution is within 
this state or any other location. 
(2) A person who violates any provision of Subsection (1) is guilty of a second 
degree felony. 
